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Abstract. Standard Qualitative Comparative Analysis is especially suited to explain diversity 
but is often diagnosed with weak findings. Its protocol either can dismiss necessary conditions 
as irrelevant and make solutions that are untrue to observations, or add irrelevant conditions as 
causal and make incorrect solutions. Additionally, the algorithm may not recognize the 
functional dependencies among conditions. These claims call for different gauges to assess the 
nature of the single conditions that are retrieved by Standard minimizations. This article 
develops “import” and “essentiality” to establish whether a condition has explanatory merit 
alone and within the wider model. When applied in prominent studies, these gauges indicate 
that Standard solutions are more sound than is often conceded. 
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Introduction 
Capital accumulation, industrialization, urbanization, and education are the steps of the 
path along which democracies have historically been proven to thrive. Alone, however, 
these “social requisites” cannot guarantee the survival of a political regime: Endurance 
also requires stable institutions (Lipset 1959). The theory has a configurational nature 
and qualifies for Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The related hypothesis 
expected the survival of democracy in interwar Europe in wealthy, industrialized, 
urbanized, literate social systems with stable governments (Berg-Schlosser and De 
Meur 1994, Rihoux and De Meur 2009). The results brought forth a discomforting 
puzzle: Although literate was a condition shared by all the survived democracies, it was 
dismissed as irrelevant. 
The phenomenon was diagnosed as a consequence of minimizing the observed and 
unobserved configurations with the Quine McCluskey algorithm. “Empirically 
necessary” conditions can disappear when the number of unobserved configurations is 
high and any of them can be used as counterfactuals to enhance the parsimony of 
solutions. To make Standard results truer to observations, Ragin and Sonnett (2004; 
Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 2013) established criteria to identify 
implausible unobserved configurations and procedures to remove them. As 
minimizations with “easy counterfactuals” restored all the necessary conditions in 
findings, “intermediate” solutions were recommended for discussion. Nevertheless, 
Baumgartner (2008, 2009) and Baumgartner and Thiem (2015, 2017a, 2017b) 
considered that plausibility concerns can lead to mistaking irrelevant conditions for 
causal, while the “row dominance” entailed in the algorithm prevents the full retrieval 
of functional dependencies and of the “true causal structure”. The debate has 
contributed to questioning the capacity of Standard Analysis to yield credible findings.  
This article advances two tests to assess whether Standard solutions include set-
theoretic irrelevant conditions or dismiss empirically relevant ones. It understands the 
set-theoretic relevance of a condition as its power to partition the heterogeneous 
instances of the outcome from a population into homogeneous subpopulations. Because 
this power may or may not be independent of the wider conjunct, two gauges are 
defined: “Import” establishes whether the uncontrolled condition alone can identify at 
least one homogeneous partition of the instances of the outcome; “essentiality” reveals 
whether the explanatory conjunct loses its capacity to homogeneous partition without 
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the condition. These gauges’ application to renowned studies shows the mistrust of the 
Standard protocol may prove fairly unjustified. 
As a matter of clarification, this article understands Standard QCA as a theory-
driven comparative method for ascribing configurational explanations in observational 
studies. Consistently with the related literature (Ragin 1987, 2008; Thomann and 
Maggetti 2017; Goertz 2017; Rohlfing 2012; Schneider and Wagemann 2010; Befani, 
Ledermann and Sager 2007; Elman 2005; Amenta and Poulsen 1994; Sartori 1991; 
Cartwright 2001; Salmon 1998; Verba 1967), it stipulates that credible explanations are 
the nonredundant, meaningful conjuncts of “right” conditions under which the outcome 
occurs. It maintains that a conjunct properly explains a subpopulation if it applies to 
each of its cases. It considers that empirical tests of the explanatory power of conjuncts 
in observational settings entail a meaningful scope condition and that the time-space 
specifications of this scope condition define the boundaries of the validity of the 
findings. Within such a design, this article holds Standard QCA can (a) assess the 
explanatory power of a conjunct and (b) ascribe conjuncts to single cases. It considers 
the first aim is achieved when the starting hypothesis yields a noncontradictory truth 
table. It considers the Quine-McCluskey algorithm suits the latter aim in observational 
studies due to its focus on invariant patterns: Because its minimizations identify same 
configurations to the same outcome, its comparisons do not require the assumption of 
instances’ background homogeneity. This suitability, however, cannot exclude 
Standard QCA from yielding more general or more specific solutions than the cases at 
hand would justify. 
Technically, this article adopts a Standard QCA lexicon and notation (Ragin 2008, 
Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Duşa 2018) with minimal adjustments. The 
explanatory conditions and outcomes are each a single property-set of which cases are 
instances from a population 𝒫. ℳ indicates a model in which whole conditions are 
elements. Conditions are always binary in nature; unless otherwise specified, slanted 
uppercase (𝑋) denotes presence and slanted lowercase (𝑥) denotes absence, while bold 
standard letters (𝐗) indicate their whole independent of gauge and state. Subscript 𝑖 
means the condition is instantiated by the 𝑖-th observation from the population 𝒫. A dot 
(·) or no sign signals set intersection and Boolean conjunction, a plus sign (+) indicates 
set union and Boolean disjunction, and a backslash (\) represents a set difference and 
complement in disjuncts. Configurations are intersections and conjunctions; the 
configurations that are listed in a truth table are “primitive” statements of sufficiency. 
A configuration is “positive” when it defines a homogeneous set of instances of the 
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presence of the outcome, is “negative” when it defines a homogeneous set of instances 
of the absence of the outcome, and is “contradictory” otherwise. Stars (∗) represent the 
unobserved configurations in 𝒫. Arrows (→) indicate a set relationship and always point 
toward the superset. Finally, “N-cons” and “S-cons” are used as short labels for the 
Standard parameters of the consistency of necessity and sufficiency, respectively. 
1. The Standard protocol and its limits 
Standard QCA finds its first analytic momentum in the construction of the truth table 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012). When the instances of the outcome are assigned to 
their matching primitives, these primitives become observed. Saturated truth-tables are 
a rare occurrence; more often, they display “limited diversity” as a gap between possible 
and observed primitives. Descriptively, this gap exposes the special ordering that 
causation imparts to diversity while unfolding in the real world. Ascription, however, 
may weaken if unobserved diversity is not treated properly (Ragin 2008). Disappearing 
necessary conditions proved this issue relevant to early QCA.  
In its first version, the protocol allowed the Quine McCluskey to yield two types of 
solutions, namely, the “complex” and the “parsimonious”, by minimizing unobserved 
configurations under the two opposite assumptions that either none or any of them could 
have produced the outcome if they were observed (Ragin 1987, 2000). Empirically 
necessary conditions were always retrieved under the former assumption, whereas some 
necessary conditions disappeared under the latter. Ragin and Sonnett (2004; Ragin 
2008) and then Schneider and Wagemann (2012) maintained unconvincing results 
depend on the use of unobserved configurations: Parsimonious minimizations assume 
that all unobserved configurations are equally plausible, although this may not always 
hold true. 
Plausibility has a special meaning in Standard QCA due to the particular rationale 
of the method as embodied in the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. Minimizations do not 
ascertain the ceteris paribus covariation of a factor and an outcome in a causally 
homogeneous sample; instead, they pinpoint the invariant parts of explanatory 
complexes across dissimilar cases with outcome of the same kind. The focus on 
invariance compels a definition of plausible counterfactuals as the unobserved 
configurations that would have led to the outcome if they were observed. Consistently 
with the theory-driven nature of the method, Ragin and Sonnett (2004) maintain that 
plausibility claims in Standard QCA rest on “directional expectations”. Before 
minimizing, the researcher establishes the state under which a condition is expected to 
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contribute to the outcome. Thus, if the theory states that A contributes to Y, then the 
unobserved configuration aBC* is an implausible match with the observed 
configuration ABC because it entails that in a hypothetical “twin” world BC would have 
generated Y under a. Once the implausible counterfactuals are barred from the 
minimizations, the Quine-McCluskey algorithm retrieves the disappearing conditions 
(Ragin 2008). As the process to the “intermediate solution”, the minimization with 
plausible counterfactuals has become an integral part of the Standard protocol. 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 2013) developed the plausibility principle further. 
They noted how directional expectations cannot ensure that each and every 
counterfactual is used non-contradictorily, in a way that does not embody any logical 
impossibility, so that the findings are perfectly true to the observations. Their Enhanced 
Standard Analysis (ESA) identifies the different nature of each logical remainder and 
establishes consistent minimization rules for each type. Applications have shown the 
ESA yields different parsimonious solutions but the same intermediate results as the 
Standard Analysis. This conclusion suggested the solutions from plausible 
minimizations are robust and, therefore, the credible findings to discuss. 
The stances that disappearing necessary conditions indicate weak ascription and 
that plausible Standard solutions are more credible than parsimonious solutions have 
been questioned by Baumgartner (2008, 2009) and Baumgartner and Thiem (2017a, 
2017b) in the light of a different epistemology. To them, configurational analysis is for 
retrieving the “true causal structure” to some effect and leaves no room for 
counterfactual reasoning: Observed configurations alone provide evidence that some 
conjunct obtains in the real world, whereas logical remainders are, “notwithstanding 
their truth, not amenable to a causal interpretation” (Baumgartner 2008:332, 
Baumgartner and Thiem 2017a). As observed configurations are redundant portrayals 
of these structures, a “correct” ascription still requires minimizations, although different 
from Standard QCA. Because the Quine-McCluskey minimizations may not report 
those implicants that are perfectly “dominated” by other solution terms, Standard QCA 
would fail to detect all the possible causal paths and the true structure of causation when 
causal factors are chained (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017a:967). Moreover, plausibility 
considerations may impart a confirmation bias in intermediate Standard solutions. The 
algorithm of the Super-/Sub-set analysis, instead, correctly yields all the implicants to 
an outcome, although its results are “fragmented” and “insufficient to warrant any 
causal inference” (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017b:5). As the Super-/Sub-Set analysis 
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also retrieves the parsimonious Standard solutions, however, this scholarship maintains 
the latter are the only findings that qualify for discussion. 
The debate has made the Standard solutions seem seriously flawed. It may always 
be the case that the protocol yields biased results or results that are untrue to 
observations, and that the algorithm cannot recognize the functional dependencies 
among conditions. However, how can we know that the Standard solutions are flawed, 
independent of the minimization algorithms? 
 
2. Criteria for assessing the merit of single conditions 
To establish whether the parsimonious or the plausible minimizations are truly 
defective, we require some foundational criteria against which the nature of single 
conditions in configurational solutions can be assessed. The literature agrees the ideal 
configurational model is an Unnecessary yet Sufficient complex of Insufficient yet 
Necessary conditions (INUS: Mackie 1965; Ragin and Strand 2008; Baumgartner 2008; 
Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 2012). The common textbook example refers to fire. 
The outcome is generated by the chemical process of combustion that unfolds under 
four conditions: the presence of oxygen (O), fuel (F), and heat (H) as well as the absence 
of fire suppressors (s). When jointly given in a context, the four conditions are always 
enough to obtain the reaction: therefore, the conjunction OFHs is a “Sufficient” 
complex. Nevertheless, it is not always the case that these conditions are jointly given; 
therefore, OFHs is an “Unnecessary” complex. Moreover, each condition is 
“Insufficient” because it cannot obtain unless all the other components are given in the 
same context; and each condition is “Necessary” because the complex cannot obtain if 
the condition is given in the “wrong” state.  
The INUS understanding of configurational causation has interesting epistemic 
consequences. Without bringing the suppressors into the picture, the fire model 
classifies as instances of the incomplete configuration OFH both those cases where the 
short circuit burned the house down and those twin cases where it did not. More 
generally, a complete INUS model sorts all the instances of the outcome into 
homogeneous subpopulations; to the contrary, when an INUS element is omitted, the 
model loses explanatory power and contradictions arise (Rihoux and de Meur 2009).  
The explanatory significance of contradictions is recognized by any technique in 
the configurational family. The scholarships agree with Ragin (1987, 2008) that a 
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condition or a complex W is sufficient to an outcome Y in 𝒫  when it arranges the 
instances of the outcome such that the distribution jointly satisfies the criteria of  
co-occurrence: 𝑊𝑖𝑌𝑖  ≠  Ø [R1] 
variation: 𝑤𝑖𝑦𝑖  ≠  Ø [R2] 
noncontradiction in sufficiency: 𝑊𝑖𝑦𝑖  =  Ø [R3] 
 
Co-occurrence as in [R1] requires that in 𝒫 at least some of the instances of the 
outcome are also instances of the condition. The criterion makes room for equifinality 
as the possibility that alternative conditions or complexes explain the outcome. 
Variation as in [R2] was especially emphasized by Goertz (2006) to disprove W is a 
trivial constant: The conditions that violate it only inflate the truth table with inert 
components and deserve dismissal. Finally, noncontradiction as in [R3] maintains that 
W is sufficient if it is never observed when the outcome is absent. Such a “negative 
existential claim” (Baumgartner 2009) is fundamental to establish the direction of 
causation. As this claim can only be proven in closed populations, it entails a scope 
condition for case selection and confines the validity of the findings within the related 
space-time region. When satisfied, however, noncontradiction ensures that W “makes a 
difference” to the instances of the outcome in 𝒫 because it unravels heterogeneity into 
homogeneous classes. 
The agreement on these criteria, and especially on [R3], is entailed by all 
configurational streams assessing sufficiency with the same parameter of fit. S-cons 
gauges how perfect the relationship is as the ratio of instances of W that are also co-
occurrences. When [R3] is satisfied, all the co-occurrences are a subset of the set of the 
instances of the outcome, and the parameter gets the value of 1; the more the violations 
to [R3], the lower the fit. A long-standing convention (Ragin 1987) maintains that 
sufficiency is acceptably established for S-cons values that are higher than 0.75, 
although the default option implemented in the many versions of Ragin’s software 
(fsQCA: Drass and Ragin 1992, Ragin and Davey 2016) raises the bar to 0.80. With 
crisp scores, these cutoffs allow the claim that W is sufficient if ¼ or ⅕ of the instances 
of W contradicts the relation, which provides a fairly relaxed standard for establishing 
the INUS nature of a factor. However, the convention has become popular as a fair 
treatment of the analysis with fuzzy-scores.  
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Fuzzy scores are meant to refine and enrich the original binary mapping of the 
conditions. Given W, fuzzy scores still indicate whether case i is a positive (𝐖𝑖 > 0.5) 
or a negative (𝐖𝑖 < 0.5) instance of it and therefore retain the information regarding a 
categorical “difference in kind”. Moreover, the reliance on log odds in the direct method 
of calibration (Ragin 2000, 2008) indicates that fuzzy scores quantify the degree of 
certainty that a case is an instance of a condition as its “classification error”. The 
certainty of classification is null and the error is highest when 𝐖𝑖 = 0.5; certainty is 
full and the error null both when𝐖𝑖 = 1.0 (which indicates that i certainly is an instance 
of 𝑊) and when 𝐖𝑖 = 0.0 (because such an i is certainly not an instance of 𝑊). This 
measurement impresses a rotation to the analytic space that slightly changes the 
understanding of sufficiency. Fuzzy scores translate subset relationships into 
inequalities so that sufficiency occurs when 𝐖𝑖 < 𝐘𝑖. The S-cons formula, then, treats 
any instance that falls below the bisector 𝐘𝑖 = 𝐖𝑖  as inconsistent to sufficiency. This 
formula cannot clearly know inconsistencies in degree from inconsistencies in kind, 
although only inconsistencies in kind signal a contradiction (Rubinson 2013). As a 
consequence, with fuzzy scores, even under a relatively demanding S-cons of 0.85, a 
contradictory condition or complex can be mistaken for sufficient, and this risk 
increases with the numerosity of the population. Nevertheless, an S-cons higher than 
0.75-0.80 and an N-cons higher than 0.90-0.95 have become the norm of reference for 
assessing the local explanatory power of both complexes and single conditions in 
Standard Analysis and in Super-/Sub-Set analysis (Ragin, 1987, 2000, 2008; Goertz, 
2006; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; Baumgartner and Thiem, 2015, 2017). Instead 
of providing a yardstick to assess the bias in the results of Standard QCA, this usage of 
Ragin’s parameters of fit adds to the concerns that Standard solutions may be flawed, 
and calls for a different measure of noncontradictoriness. 
 
3. Introducing import and essentiality 
A faithful gauge of INUS conditions renders the requisite of noncontradiction in 
sufficiency as the capacity to ensure that all the instances of the outcome in 𝒫  are 
clustered into homogeneous partitions. This capacity can be assessed through a forward 
and a backward strategy. Forward is observed when the condition can isolate at least 
one homogeneous subpopulation from 𝒫 when applied alone. Backward is established 
as the increase in the heterogeneity of the subpopulations in a truth table once the 
condition is dropped from the starting model. In the following, the forward assessment 
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will be referred to as the “import” of a condition, while the backward strategy defines 
its “essentiality”.  
The main differences from the Standard parameters rest on import and essentiality 
being based on numerosity instead of membership, and on them being calculated on the 
whole of 𝒫 instead of subpopulations of only positive or negative instances. The choice 
is compelled by the need to assess the “ordering power” of a condition as a whole (𝐖) 
instead of a special state (𝑊 separate from 𝑤). Import and essentiality, therefore, do not 
substitute Ragin’s parameters in assessing sufficiency. Their aim is diagnostic instead, 
to detect the ordering power of single conditions within and before the overall model 
independent of minimizations, and to assess the nature of the components of Standard 
solution terms. 
3.1. Import 
This measure rests on the number of instances sharing the same kind of outcome 
that a condition singles out of a naturally heterogeneous population. The actual 
operation is almost banal. 
Let: 
- ℳ be a model to explain 𝐘 by 𝑘 conditions in a population 𝒫 of 𝒩 instances; 
- 𝐗 be the 𝑘-th explanatory condition in ℳ; and 
- 𝓂𝐗 be a submodel of ℳ such that 𝓂𝐗 = {𝐗}. 
𝓂𝐗 sorts the instances in 𝒫 into two clusters — both, none, or one of which can be 
homogeneous with respect to 𝐘. Therefore, let: 
- 𝓅X  be the overall subpopulation of the homogeneous instances that are generated 
by 𝓂𝐗 and 
- 𝓃X be the numerosity of 𝓅X. 
The import of 𝐗 in 𝒫 (impX) is then given by the following ratio:  
impX = 
numerosity of the homogenous subpopulation 𝓅𝐗 





The index can take any value between 0.00 and 1.00. The highest score proves a 
condition is necessary and sufficient to the outcome, as its partitions order the 
population in two homogeneous subgroups. To the contrary, the index’s lowest score 
proves the condition alone has no ordering power in 𝒫. 
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3.2. Essentiality 
ImpX can improve our knowledge of the explanatory power of single conditions but 
does not capture the configurational sense of it. The other side is decided by the 
contribution of single conditions to a noncontradictory truth table. 𝐗 proves essential to 
the model if its removal results in higher truth table heterogeneity. Essentiality can 
therefore be gauged as the difference in the number of instances in contradictory 
primitives between the full model and the same model without this condition.  
More precisely, if we let: 
- ℳ  be the model that explains 𝐘 with k conditions in the population 𝒫 of 
𝒩 instances,  
- 𝒬  be the heterogeneous subpopulation of the instances from the contradictory 
primitives in  ℳ,  
- 𝐗 be the k-th explanatory condition in ℳ, 
- 𝓂𝐗
′  be a submodel of ℳ such that ℳ\𝓂𝐗
′  = {X},  
- 𝓆𝐗
′  be the subpopulation of the instances from the contradictory primitives in 𝓂𝐗
′ ,  
- 𝓆𝐗
″ be the difference 𝓆𝐗
′ \𝒬, and 𝓃𝐗
″  its numerosity, 
then the essentiality of 𝐗 (essX) reads as follows: 
essX = 








Again, the index spans from 1.00 to 0.00. The ratio is null when the dropped 
condition is nonessential, because the number of instances in the contradictory 
primitives does not increase, and 𝓃𝑋
″  is 0.00. The index takes the value of 1.00 when 
the only necessary and sufficient condition is dropped so that 𝓃𝑋
″ = 𝒩and the entire 
population becomes heterogeneous.  
3.3. The relationship between import and essentiality 
Were ℳ made of INUS factors only, and each INUS factor modeled at the proper 
level of abstraction (as are “heat” or “fuel”), the forward and the backward power of 
single conditions would align. However, we may have an interest in modeling the INUS 
factors at a lower level of abstraction (as “short circuits” and “unattended stoves” or 
“towels” and “oil”), and may mistake some conditions for causal in the process. 
Therefore, the reasonable default expectation shall rather maintain that import and 
essentiality do not align.  
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All the logically possible types of conditions can be found in a given model: 
essential and important, essential although unimportant, important although inessential, 
and unimportant and inessential. However, only the essential qualify as truly INUS 
conditions in 𝒫, because essentiality proves that they are required for noncontradictory 
truth tables — that is, they are required for ℳ to satisfy [R3]. Thus, we may consider 
configurational solutions: 
(1) are seriously flawed if they cannot retrieve all the essential conditions, 
independent of their import; 
(2) retain explanatory validity when they include important although inessential 
conditions.  
The case that  
(3) unimportant and inessential conditions are added to the explanation  
would instead contribute to the doubts on the credibility of the results — unless a 
good reason can be provided for their retrieval. 
 
4. Assessing the explanatory validity of Standard solutions  
Import and essentiality can identify the nature of the conditions from different solutions 
and adjudicate on the relative flaws of the Standard Analysis. In the following section, 
such an assessment will comprise the results from two renowned studies: the 
configurational application of Lipset’s theory to explain the survival of democracy in 
the interwar Europe, and the mechanism of shame in explaining governments’ 
compliance with international fishery regimes.  
4.1. The survival of democracy in the interwar Europe 
According to the Standard protocol, the reliance on plausibility constraints in 
minimizations is mainly justified by the disappearing of necessary conditions, which 
makes the results untrue to the observations. The textbook example remains Lipset’s 
hypothesis as applied by Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (1994) and Rihoux and De Meur 
(2009). With five conditions to gauge wealthy (W), industrialized (I), urbanized (U) and 
literate (L) social systems with stable (S) governments, the model generates 32 
primitives of which the selected cases leave 23 unobserved, as displayed in Table 1(a). 
– TABLE 1 – 
11 
As Table 1(b) shows, the consistency scores of individual conditions indicate that 
L is as necessary to Y as are W and S. Nonetheless, parsimonious minimizations drop it 
from the solutions to the positive outcome 𝑊𝑆 → 𝑌.  When conditioned to the 
directional expectations that each condition contributes to the survival of democracy 
when present, the minimizations restore L, and the plausible solution reads 𝑊𝑆𝐿 → 𝑌.  
– TABLE 2 & TABLE 3 – 
The new gauges attest that the puzzle of the disappearing condition does not depend 
on any forward ordering power. Table 2 again finds W, L, and S as the only factors 
with import in the model. From Table 3, however, we learn W and S are the only 
essential conditions that together can account for the entirety of 𝒫’s diversity. The 
reason is the import of L depends on the subpopulation 𝓹L, which clusters Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Romania and Spain – all experiencing the breakdown of their democracies 
between the two World Wars, as displayed in Table 2(d). As Table 3(d) shows, all of 
these negative instances can be accounted for by the conjunctions of the remaining 
conditions.  
From the analysis of the positive outcome, we learn that conditions with a N-cons 
value of 1.00 are important yet may disappear when the instances that confer them their 
sorting power can be ordered by the remaining essential conditions. The assessment 
also proves that the parsimonious minimizations have correctly retrieved from ℳ all 
and only the essential conditions to 𝑌 in 𝒫, while the plausible minimizations have 
restored in solutions the “important although inessential” conditions. 
When we run the Standard Analysis of the negative outcome, however, we find that 
the parsimonious solution reads 𝑠 + 𝑤 → 𝑦 but that plausibility constraints specify the 
result as 𝑠 + 𝑤𝑢𝑖 → 𝑦. Thus, here again the parsimonious minimizations retrieve all 
and only the essential conditions, whereas the plausible minimizations add to the 
essential term 𝑤  two additional factors, 𝑢 and 𝑖 , although none of them has proven 
import.  
The truth table provides the explanation for the retrieval of these unimportant 
conditions in Standard plausible solutions. Table 1(a) shows that in the primitives to the 
negative outcome from (04) to (07), when W is absent, I and U are also absent. The 
unreported calculation of the consistency scores of 𝑖 and 𝑢 proves that they are fully 
necessary to 𝑤. Therefore, 𝑖 and 𝑢 are “co-invariant” conditions with the essential term 
𝑤 that have survived the plausibility test. Plausibility constraints emphasize that low 
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national wealth implies low urbanization and low industrialization in the negative cases 
at hand — a hardly surprising specification considering development theory but a fairly 
surprising specification considering the shared tenet that the Quine-McCluskey 
algorithm cannot recognize functional dependencies. 
 
4.2. Shame and compliance with international regimes 
A further illuminating example comes from Stokke’s analysis on the role of 
shaming in governments’ compliance with international fishery regimes. The original 
model renders the hypothesis that shaming can improve compliance “by exposing 
certain practices to third parties whose opinion matters to the intended target of 
shaming” (Stokke 2007:503). The analysis then focuses on the conditions under which 
noncomplying governments changed their behavior in response to shaming pressures.  
The model pinpoints two factors that relate to regime design: advice (A), which 
gauges “whether the shamers can substantiate their criticisms by referencing explicit 
advice by the regime’s scientific body”; and commitment (C), which captures “whether 
the target behavior violates commitments assumed under the regime.” Three additional 
conditions are instead related to the direct institutional environment of the government: 
inconvenience (I) models the costs of compliance; the shadow of the future (S) indicates 
the perceived risk that shame will bring the government into international disrepute as 
a partner; and reverberation (R) refers to the shame that is echoed by strong domestic 
constituencies and that can undermine the voters’ support of the government. The model 
is tested on a population of nine regimes that were implemented since the 1970s in the 
three regions of the Barents Sea, Northwest Atlantic, and Antarctic. The data generate 
a truth table of 32 primitives, only 8 of which are observed as displayed in Table 4(a). 
-- TABLE 4 -- 
The Standard Analysis of individual consistency as in Table 4(b) pinpoints two 
individually necessary conditions: A, for which it is true that 𝐴 ←  𝑌 and 𝑎 →  𝑦; and 
I, for which it holds that 𝑖 →  𝑌 and 𝐼 ←  𝑦. Standard parsimonious minimizations to 
the positive outcome retain I and rule out A from the positive solution 𝑖 + 𝑆𝑅 →  𝑌. 
Under the directional expectations that all conditions contribute to compliance when 
present with the exception of inconvenience, which must be absent, the Standard 
plausible minimizations bring A back and yield 𝐴(𝑖 + 𝑆𝑅) → 𝑌.  
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The analysis of the positive outcome again begs the question of why, despite similar 
individual consistency scores, the Quine-McCluskey algorithm retrieves A under 
plausible assumptions only while I already appears in the parsimonious solutions. If we 
address the puzzle from the angle of ordering power, from Table 5 we again learn that 
the different treatment does not follow from import, because both A and I have it. 
Instead, the two conditions display different essentiality: Table 6 shows the explanatory 
capacity of the model is independent of A and highly dependent on I — without which 
contradictory configurations arise that cover four of the nine instances.  
– TABLE 5 & TABLE 6 – 
Table 5 highlights the import of A depends on two negative instances (lh and k1 in 
the table), which can be handled by the essential conditions S, I, R. What justifies the 
dismissal of 𝐴 under parsimonious rules, and its retrieval under plausibility rules, again 
follows from its “co-invariance” with the essential compound. If we go back to Table 
4(a), we see that 𝐴  is constant across all the positive primitives, and it is easy to 
calculate that it is fully necessary to both solution terms 𝑖 and 𝑆𝑅. 
The minimizations to the negative outcome arise a similar puzzle, although 
regarding a sufficient condition. Please note that the model generates an ambiguity in 
minimization: the prime implicant chart indicates 𝑠𝐼  and 𝑠𝑅  are alternative solution 
terms from the same primitives, although 𝑠𝑅 covers only one instance (m2 in the table) 
that can also be explained by 𝑠𝐼. For the sake of brevity, 𝑠𝐼 only is considered in the 
following. Therefore, the parsimonious solution reads 𝐼(𝑟 + 𝑠) → 𝑦 , whereas the 
plausible minimizations find that 𝐼(𝑟 + 𝑐𝑠) → 𝑦 . The puzzle arises because of 𝐂 . 
Plausibility requires it in one term of the negative solutions although our gauges say it 
is an inessential element in the model which, moreover, also lacks import. Nevertheless, 
Table 4(a) again shows 𝑐 is “co-invariant” with the essential component 𝑠. As easy 
calculations can prove, the absence of 𝐂 is perfectly necessary to 𝐼𝑠 in the cases at hand. 
Strictly speaking, the entire population’s diversity can therefore be explained by the 
sole essential conditions 𝐒, 𝐈 and 𝐑, which the parsimonious minimizations identify 
correctly. However, 𝐴 maintains a perfect set-relationship with both the essential terms 
of the positive solution and 𝑐 with one essential term of the negative solution; thus, the 
plausible minimizations retrieve them regardless of their essentiality, and of their 
import, as functionally dependent conditions on the essential terms. 
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5. Final considerations 
The article has assumed that, although suitable for refining and ascribing an 
explanation, the Standard usage of the Quine-McCluskey algorithm may yield flawed 
solutions. Configurational scholars have recognized that the free use of unobserved 
configurations as counterfactuals in minimizations may prevent the retrieval of all the 
explanatory factors, especially when they are linked in functional dependence, whereas 
conditioning solutions to considerations of plausibility may lead to mistaking irrelevant 
conditions for causal.  
To ascertain whether the Standard protocol really fails to ascribe causation 
properly, this article builds on the homogeneity of the subpopulations generated by an 
explanatory model as the test that the model “holds true”. When applied to single 
conditions and understood as the capacity to unravel heterogeneity and prevent 
contradictions, homogeneity signals that a condition has import when applied alone and 
is essential with respect to the model.  
Import and essentiality are not gauges for ascription. More basically, they assess 
whether the conditions in the solutions are all and only required to provide a consistent 
and valid causal story that applies to all the cases at hand. For the claim of explanatory 
validity to hold true, this article established that Standard solutions had to retrieve all 
and only the essential conditions, while important yet inessential conditions were the 
expected additions under plausibility restraints, and unimportant inessential conditions 
would signal the inability of the Standard protocol to yield sound results.  
First applications show that, indeed, the Standard parsimonious solutions always 
and only include the essential conditions. Standard plausible solutions instead retrieve 
conditions beyond their import, when they “co-unvary” with the essential explanatory 
terms. Thus, plausible minimizations prove vulnerable to “spurious co-invariance”; at 
the same time, they retrieve the conditions that are implied by their joint essential term. 
This result suggests that high limited diversity does not affect the credibility of the 
parsimonious findings, and that plausible minimizations can detect functional 
dependencies as overlapping subsets. Essentiality and import thus give further meaning 
to the distinction between “core” and “peripheral” conditions in solutions (Fiss 2011): 
The core conditions coincide with the essential factors, and the peripheral conditions 
converge with the related dependencies. If only the core conditions qualify as proven 
INUS conditions, the peripheral conditions still are of interest to researchers as the 
possible catalysts of the essential chemical reaction. 
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However, imp and ess can do more than test the explanatory merit of the solutions 
in Standard configurational studies. They can also suggest the existence of latent 
compounds within the starting model, which is of interest to the research agenda on 
necessary conditions (e.g., Rohlfing 2012; Schneider 2008). A latent compound can be 
detected among conditions that maintain de Morgan’s relationships across solutions so 
that they can be “compressed” into single super-conditions with higher individual 
explanatory power (Elman 2005; Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 1994, 2009). The 
existence of such latent compounds can be anticipated when the starting model includes 
conditions that qualify as essential yet lack import, as is the case of conditions 𝐒 and 𝐑 
in Stokke’s model.  
Recall from Tables 4 and 5 the Standard parameters and import scores agree that 
neither the shadow of the future nor the reverberation of shame from important 
domestic constituencies can order the instances of failure and success of shaming when 
they are used alone. Nevertheless, essentiality scores in Table 6 prove they are required 
for a noncontradictory explanation of the cases at hand, together with the essential and 
important condition of the inconvenience from the high costs of compliance. In short, 
essentiality suggests that 𝐒 and 𝐑 constitute functional complements. The parsimonious 
Standard solutions corroborate this suggestion: 𝑆𝑅  provides a path to successful 
shaming, while 𝑠 +  𝑟 is its de Morgan complement that leads to ineffective shaming 
when the inconvenience from complying is high. If the two are “compressed” into a 
single super-condition that only allows the conjunction of their presence and the 
disjunction of their absence, the new condition should prove essential and important, 
and its backward capacity be aligned with its forward capacity.  
When the single factor 𝐊 is computed such that 𝐾 = 𝑆𝑅 and 𝑘 = (𝑠 + 𝑟), Table 
7(a) indeed shows that 𝑘  is necessary to failure, while 𝐾  is sufficient to success; 
moreover, Table 7(b) indicates that 𝐊 has import on 𝐘. Table 8 reports the effects that 
streamlining has on the analysis. When model ℳ1 = {𝐀, 𝐂, 𝐈, 𝐊} is used instead of ℳ =
{𝐀, 𝐂, 𝐒, 𝐈, 𝐑} to explain 𝐘, the number of the possible primitives lowers from 32 to 16; 
nevertheless, submodel 𝓂𝟏𝐀
′  in Table 8(a) and submodel  𝓂𝟏𝐂
′  in Table 8(b) show that 
the essentiality of 𝐀  and 𝐂  is still null. The creation of 𝐊  mostly affects 𝓂𝟏𝐈
′ ; as 
displayed in Table 8(c), a lower number of primitives improves the essentiality of 𝐈, 
without which now five instances of the nine cannot be classified properly. The same 
degree of essentiality is displayed by 𝐊 in Table 8(d).  
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The gauges confirm that 𝐊 is both an important and essential condition to 𝐘. Its 
usage, however, has consequences on the plausible Standard solutions to the negative 
outcome. Table 9 makes clear the compression of 𝐒  and 𝐑  into 𝐊  meaningfully 
modifies the observed diversity of the negative instances. All the instances of 𝑦 are now 
contained in the primitives (05) to (07) across which condition 𝐂 does not preserve its 
invariance anymore — therefore, should never be retrieved as a plausible catalyst. 
Indeed, it is easy to calculate that the parsimonious minimization of ℳ1 still explains 
the positive outcome as 𝑖 + 𝐾 → 𝑌 (therefore, by condition design, as 𝑖 + 𝑆𝑅 → 𝑌) and 
the plausible minimizations again retrieve 𝐴(𝑖 + 𝐾) →  𝑌. In the minimizations to the 
negative outcome, 𝐊 instead prevents the ambiguity of the prime implicant chart and 
makes the plausible Standard solutions overlap the parsimonious reading 𝐼𝑘 → 𝑦 (that 
is, 𝐼(𝑟 + 𝑠) → 𝑦 by condition design).  
The exercise suggests that the imp and ess of single conditions can be aligned 
through compression, and that the consequent reduction of the logical diversity can 
prevent ambiguity in minimization. It also suggests that model streamlining does not 
affect the core component of the solutions, but it may come at the cost of ruling out 
some functional dependencies and the retrieval of the catalysts — that is, with 
information loss. Whether such a lossy compression has any value, it only depends on 
the substantive credibility of the starting model, and on the special knowledge that the 
analysis is expected to yield.  
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Table 1. Survival of democracy in the interwar Europe:  
(a) truth table from model ℳ = {𝐖, 𝐈, 𝐔, 𝐋, 𝐒}, and  
(b) Standard consistency of single conditions in ℳ. 
 




Instances  Y 
 Condition 
tested 
Outcome: Y Outcome: y 
W I U L S  N-cons S-cons N-cons S-cons 
(01) 1 1 1 1 1 BE, CZ, NL, 
GB 
1  W 1.00 0.80 0.20 0.20 
(02) 1 0 0 1 1 FI, IE 1  w 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.00 
(03) 1 1 0 1 1 FR, SE 1  I 0.75 0.75 0.20 0.25 
(04) 0 0 0 0 0 GR, PT, ES 0  i 0.25 0.20 0.80 0.80 
(05) 0 0 0 1 0 HU, PL 0  U 0.50 0.80 0.10 0.20 
(06) 0 0 0 0 1 IT, RO 0  u 0.50 0.31 0.90 0.69 
(07) 0 0 0 1 1 EE 0  L 1.00 0.61 0.50 0.38 
(08) 1 1 0 1 0 AT 0  l 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 
(09) 1 1 1 1 0 DE 0  S 1.00 0.71 0.30 0.27 
Primitives (10) to (32) are 
unobserved, hence not reported 
𝓠 ={ Ø }  s 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.00 
       
 




Table 2. Survival of democracy in the interwar Europe: import of single conditions in ℳ. 
 (𝓝 =18) 
(a)    (b)    (c)   
W instances Y  I Instances Y  U instances Y 
1 
AT, BE, CZ, FI, FR,  
DE, IE, NL, SE, GB 
Cd  1 
AT, BE , CZ, FR, DE,  
NL, SE, GB 
Cd  1 




EE, GR, HU, IT, PL, 
PT, RO, ES 
0  0 
EE, FI, GR, HU, IE,  
IT, PL, PT, RO, ES 
Cd  0 
AT, EE, FI, FR, GR,  
HU, IE, IT, PL, PT,  
RO, ES, SE 
Cd 
           
𝓹W ={EE, GR, HU, IT,  
PL, PT, RO, ES } 
  𝓹I ={Ø}   𝓹U ={Ø}  
 impW = 0.44    impI= 0.00    impU = 0.00  
           
(d)    (e)       
L instances Y  S instances Y     
1 
AT, BE , CZ, EE, FI,  
FR, DE, HU, IE, NL,  
PL, SE, GB 
Cd  1 
BE , CZ, EE, FI, FR,  
IE, IT, NL, RO, SE, 
GB 
Cd     
0 GR, IT, PT, RO, ES 0  0 
AT, DE, GR, HU, PL,  
PT, ES 
0     
           
𝓹L ={GR, IT, PT, RO, 
ES} 
  𝓹S ={AT, DE, GR, HU,  
PL, PT, ES} 
     
 impL = 0.28    impS = 0.39      
 
Key: ‘Cd’ is for ‘contradictory partition’, ‘1’ is for ‘positive partition’, ‘0’ is for ‘negative partition’. 





Table 3. Survival of democracy in the interwar Europe: essentiality of single conditions in ℳ. 
 (𝓝 =18, 𝓠=Ø) 
(a) 𝓶′W   (b) 𝓶′I  a (c) 𝓶′U  
Primi 
tive 
Conditions    Primi 
tive 
Conditions    Primi 
tive 
Conditions   
I U L S instances Y  W U L S instances Y  W I L S instances Y 
(01) 1 0 1 0 AT 0  (01) 1 0 1 0 AT 0  (01) 1 1 1 0 AT, DE 0 
(02) 1 1 1 1 
BE, CZ, 
NL, GB 
1  (02) 1 1 1 1 










(03) 0 0 1 1 EE, FI, IE Cd  (03) 0 0 1 1 EE 0  (03) 0 0 1 1 EE 0 
(04) 1 0 1 1 FR, SE 1  (04) 1 0 1 1 




(04) 1 0 1 1 FI, IE 1 
(05) 1 1 1 0 DE 0  (05) 1 1 1 0 DE 0 
 




(06) 0 0 0 0 GR, PT, ES 0  (06) 0 0 0 0 GR, PT, ES 0  (06) 0 0 1 0 HU, PL 0 
(07) 0 0 1 0 HU, PL 0  (07) 0 0 1 0 HU, PL 0  (07) 0 0 0 1 IT, RO 0 
(08) 0 0 0 1 IT, RO 0  (08) 0 0 0 1 IT, RO 0         
                       
𝓺′A ={ EE, FI, IE }   𝓺′C ={ Ø }   𝓺′S={ Ø }  
essA = 0.17   essC = 0.00   essS = 0.00  
           
 (d) 𝓶′L   (e) 𝓶′S   
Primi 
tive 
conditions   Primi 
tive 
conditions   
W I U S instances Y  W I U L instances Y  
(01) 1 1 0 0 AT 0  (01) 1 1 0 1 AT, FR, SE Cd  
(02) 1 1 1 1 
BE, CZ,  
NL, GB 
1  (02) 1 1 1 1 
BE, CZ, 




(03) 0 0 0 1 EE, IT, RO 0  (03) 0 0 0 1 EE, HU, PL 0  
(04) 1 0 0 1 FI, IE 1  (04) 1 0 0 1 FI, IE 1  
(05) 1 1 0 1 FR, SE 1  (05) 0 0 0 0 




(06) 1 1 1 0 DE 0          
(07) 0 0 0 0 




      
 
                
 
𝓺′I ={ Ø }   
 𝓺′R ={AT, FR, SE, BE, CZ,  
DE, NL, GB } 
 
 
 essI= 0.00    essR= 0.44   
 
Note: all the submodels generate 16 logical primitives; the unobserved ones are not reported. 
Key: ‘Cd’ is for ‘contradictory partition’, ‘1’ is for ‘positive partition’, ‘0’ is for ‘negative partition’ 




Table 4. Shame and compliance to international regimes: 
(a) truth table from model ℳ = {𝐀, 𝐂, 𝐒, 𝐈, 𝐑}, and  
(b) Standard consistency scores of single conditions. 
 
Data source: Stokke (2007). 
  







outcome: Y outcome: y 
A C S I R  N-cons S-cons N-cons S-cons 
(01) 1 0 1 1 1 of 1  A 1.00 0.57 0.60 0.43 
(02) 1 1 1 1 1 c 1  a 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.00 
(03) 1 1 1 0 0 EC2 1  C 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.33 
(04) 1 0 0 0 0 kR 1  c 0.50 0.33 0.80 0.67 
(05) 1 0 0 1 1 m2 0  S 0.75 0.75 0.20 0.25 
(06) 1 0 0 1 0 m1 0  s 0.25 0.20 0.80 0.80 
(07) 0 0 0 1 0 lh,k1 0  I 0.50 0.29 1.00 0.71 
(08) 1 1 1 1 0 EC1 0  i 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Logical primitives (09) to (32) are 
unobserved, hence unreported 
𝓠 ={ Ø }  R 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.33 
   r 0.50 0.33 0.80 0.67 
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Table 5.  Shame and compliance to international regimes: import of single conditions in ℳ. 
 (𝓝 =9) 
(a)    (b)    (c)   
A instances Y  C instances Y  S instances Y 
1 
of, m1, m2, cp,  
EC1, EC2, kR 
Cd  1 
cp, EC1, 
EC2 




0 lh, k1 0  0 
of, m1, m2,  
lh, k1, kR 
Cd  0 
m1, m2, 
lh, k1, kR 
Cd 
           
𝓹A  ={ lh, k1 }   𝓹C ={ Ø}   𝓹S ={ Ø}  
 impA = 0.22    impC = 0.00    impS = 0.00  
           
(d)    (e)       
I instances Y  R instances Y     
1 
of, m1,m2 ,lh, 
cp, EC1, k1 
Cd  1 of, m2,cp Cd     
0 EC2, kR 1  0 
m1, lh, EC1, 
EC2, k1, kR 
Cd     
           
𝓹I ={ EC2, kR }   𝓹R ={ Ø }      
 impI = 0.22    impR = 0.00      
 
Key: ‘Cd’ is for ‘contradictory partition’, ‘1’ is for ‘positive partition’, ‘0’ is for ‘negative partition’ 




Table 6. Shame and compliance to international regimes: essentiality of single conditions in ℳ. 
 (𝓝 =9, 𝓠=Ø) 
(a) 𝓶′A  a (b) 𝓶′C   (c) 𝓶′S  
primi 
tive 
conditions   primi 
tive 
conditions   primi 
tive 
conditions  
C S I R instances Y  A S I R instances Y  A C I R instances Y 
(01) 0 1 1 1 of 1  (01) 1 1 1 1 of, cp 1  (01) 1 0 1 1 of, m2 Cd 
(02) 0 0 1 0 m1, lh, k1 0  (02) 1 0 1 0 m1 0  (02) 1 0 1 0 m1 0 
(03) 0 0 1 1 m2 0  (03) 1 0 1 1 m2 0  (03) 0 0 1 0 lh, k1 0 
(04) 1 1 1 1 cp 1  (04) 0 0 1 0 lh, k1 0  (04) 1 1 1 1 cp 1 
(05) 1 1 1 0 EC1 0  (05) 1 1 1 0 EC1 0  (05) 1 1 1 0 EC1 0 
(06) 1 1 0 0 EC2 1  (06) 1 1 0 0 EC2 1  (06) 1 1 0 0 EC2 1 
(07) 0 0 0 1 kR 1  (07) 1 0 0 0 kR 1  (07) 1 0 0 0 kR 1 
                       
𝓺′A ={ Ø }   𝓺′C ={ Ø }   𝓺′S={ of, m2 }  
essA = 0.00   essC = 0.00   essS = 0.22  
           
(d) 𝓶′I   (e) 𝓶′R   
primi 
tive 
conditions   primi 
tive 
conditions   
A C S R instances  Y  A C S I instances Y  
(01) 1 0 1 1 of 1  (01) 1 0 1 1 of 1  
(02) 1 0 0 0 m1,kR Cd  (02) 1 0 0 1 m1,m2 0  
(03) 1 0 0 1 m2 0  (03) 0 0 0 1 lh,kl1 0  
(04) 0 0 0 0 lh,k1 0  (04) 1 1 1 1 cp,EC1 Cd  
(05) 1 1 1 1 cp 1  (05) 1 1 1 0 EC2 1  
(06) 1 1 1 0 EC1,EC2 Cd  (06) 1 0 0 0 kR 1  
                
𝓺′I ={ m1, kR, EC1, EC2}   𝓺′R ={ cp, EC1 }   
essI= 0.44   essR= 0.22   
 
Note: all the submodels generate 16 logical primitives; the unobserved ones are not reported. 
Key: ‘Cd’ is for ‘contradictory partition’, ‘1’ is for ‘positive partition’, ‘0’ is for ‘negative partition’. 




Table 7. Shame and compliance to international regimes: 
(a) consistency and (b) import of condition K. 
 (𝓝 =9, 𝓠=Ø) 
 
Key: ‘Cd’ is for ‘contradictory partition’, ‘1’ is for ‘positive partition’, ‘0’ is for ‘negative partition’. 
Data source: Stokke (2007). 
  
(a)      (b)   
condition  
tested 
outcome: Y outcome: y  
K instances Y 
N-cons S-cons N-cons S-cons  
K (=SR) 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 c 1 (= SR) of, cp 1 
k (=s+r) 
0.50 0.29 1.00 0.71 
 0 (= s+r) EC2, kR, m1,m2,lh, EC1, 
k1 
Cd 
         
      𝓹K = {of, cp}  
    impK = 0.22  
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Table 8. Shame and compliance to international regimes: 
Essentiality of the conditions in ℳ1 = {𝐀, 𝐂, 𝐈, 𝐊}. 
 (𝓝 =9, 𝓠=Ø) 
(a) 𝓶′1A  a (b) 𝓶′1C  
primi 
tive 
conditions   primi 
tive 
conditions  
C I K instances Y  A I K instances Y 
(01) 1 0 0 EC2 1  (01) 1 0 0 EC2, kR 1 
(02) 0 1 1 of 1  (02) 1 1 1 of, cp 1 
(03) 0 0 0 kR 1  (03) 0 1 0 lh, k1 0 
(04) 1 1 1 cp 1  (04) 1 1 0 m1, EC1 ,m2 0 
(05) 0 1 0 lh,m1,k1,m2 0        
(06) 1 1 0 EC1 0        
             
𝓺′1A ={ Ø }   𝓺′1C ={ Ø }  
ess1A = 0.00   ess1C= 0.00  
       
(c) 𝓶′1I  a (d) 𝓶′1K  
primi 
tive 
conditions   primi 
tive 
conditions  
A C K Instances Y  A C I instances Y 
(01) 






1 1 0 
EC2 1 
(02) 1 0 1 of 1  (02) 1 0 1 of, m1, m2 Cd 
(03) 
1 0 0 





1 0 0 
kR 1 
(04) 1 1 1 cp 1  (04) 1 1 1 cp, EC1 Cd 
(05) 0 0 0 lh, k1 0  (05) 0 0 1 lh, k1 0 
             
𝓺′1I ={ m1, m2, kR, EC1, EC2}   𝓺′1K={ of, m1, m2, cp, EC1}  
ess1I= 0.56   ess1K= 0.56  
 
Note: all the submodels generate 8 logical primitives; the unobserved ones are not reported. 
Key: ‘Cd’ is for ‘contradictory partition’, ‘1’ is for ‘positive’, ‘0’ is for ‘negative’. 




Table 9. Shame and compliance to international regimes: 





A C I K 
(01) 1 1 0 0 EC2 1 
(02) 1 0 1 1 of 1 
(03) 1 0 0 0 kR 1 
(04) 1 1 1 1 cp 1 
(05) 0 0 1 0 lh,k1 0 
(06) 1 0 1 0 m1,m2 0 
(07) 1 1 1 0 EC1 0 
Logical primitives (08) to (16) 
are unobserved, hence 
unreported 
𝓠 ={ Ø } 
Note: K calculated as in Table 4(a). 
Key: ‘Cd’ is for ‘contradictory partition’, ‘1’ is for ‘positive partition’, ‘0’ is for ‘negative partition’. 
Data source: Stokke (2007). 
 
 
